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Abstract: Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is widely criticized for being an 
unreliable form of ampliative inference – partly because the explanatory hypotheses we 
have considered at a given time may all be false, and partly because there is an 
asymmetry between the comparative judgment on which an IBE is based and the 
absolute verdict that IBE is meant to license. In this paper, I present a further reason to 
doubt the epistemic merits of IBE and argue that it motivates moving to an inferential 
pattern in which IBE emerges as a degenerate limiting case. Since this inferential pattern 
is structurally similar to an argumentative strategy known as Inferential Robustness 
Analysis (IRA), it effectively combines the most attractive features of IBE and IRA into 
a unified approach to non-deductive inference. 
 
1. Inference to the Best Explanation 
On standard formulations, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a form of non-
deductive inference in which one infers a hypothesis because it would, if true, provide a better 
explanation of one’s evidence than any other available competing explanatory hypothesis.1 
An explanation is considered ‘better’ than another to the extent that it exhibits various 
explanatory virtues – e.g. parsimony and explanatory scope – which jointly constitute the 
explanation’s ‘loveliness’ (Lipton 2004: 59-62). Although early discussions of IBE saw it as a 
fundamental and free-standing form of inference warranting full belief in its conclusions, it 
has now become more-or-less standard for proponents of IBE to view it as an approximation 
to, or heuristic for, some form of probabilistic reasoning in which rational agents assign 
subjective probabilities to hypotheses.
2
 In Lipton’s influential turn of phrase, ‘Inference to 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Harman 1965, Thagard 1978, Lycan 1988, and Lipton 2004. 
2
 See, e.g., Okasha 2000, McGrew 2003, Lipton 2004, and Henderson 2014. 
 
2 
the Best Explanation proposes that loveliness is a guide to likeliness (a.k.a. posterior 
probability)’ (2004: 115). 
It is worth noting that many inferences that are commonly characterized as instances 
of IBE are only indirectly inferences in which one compares explanatory hypotheses with 
respect to their loveliness. While paradigmatic instances of IBE involve inferring a hypothesis 
H from the fact that it best explains some evidence E, many proponents of IBE also classify 
it as IBE when one infers H in virtue of H being entailed by some other hypothesis H* that 
best explains E. For example, Lipton suggests that in Newton’s days IBE licensed an 
inference from various terrestrial experiments, ET, to laws governing planetary motion, LP, 
since ET is best explained by Newton’s laws of motion, LN, which in turn entail LP. Thus, while 
LP certainly doesn’t explain ET, LP is still inferable from ET via IBE (Lipton 2004: 63-64). In 
fact, the possibility of inferring indirectly via IBE in this way was already exploited by Harman 
(1965: 91) when he argued that all enumerative inductions could be construed as instances 
of IBE.
3
 
 One familiar criticism of IBE attacks the idea that the various explanatory virtues that 
jointly constitute explanatory loveliness are correlated with rational probability assignments 
(see, e.g., van Fraassen 1985; Barnes 1995; Bartelborth 2005). In this paper, however, I will 
set such worries aside and instead assume, if only for the sake of the argument, that some 
such connection holds (at least ceteris paribus) given a suitably chosen set of ‘explanatory 
virtues’ for IBE to operate with. What I will be concerned with is the peculiar structure of 
IBE, which involves comparing a set of available competing hypotheses before inferring that 
the loveliest such hypothesis at least somewhat likely to be true. These structural features of 
IBE correspond closely to many actual cases of theory-choice in science and philosophy, 
where making an inference depends crucially on comparisons between extant alternatives as 
opposed to evaluations of individual theories in vacuo. Indeed, it is at least partly because 
the structure of IBE seems to correspond to actual scientific and philosophical practice that 
realists of various stripes often endorse and defend IBE. 
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 The best-known criticism of IBE on structural grounds is no doubt van Fraassen’s 
objection that an explanatory hypothesis may provide the best explanation of the currently 
available competitors only because we haven’t (yet) considered a hypothesis that would 
explain even better. Thus van Fraassen contends that IBE might well lead us to choosing ‘the 
best of a bad lot’ (1989: 142-143). Indeed, for this reason, van Fraassen claims that we should 
treat any conclusion of IBE as a random member of a set of explanatory hypothesis most of 
which are false (1989: 146). While that might be something of an exaggeration, the fact 
remains that the bad lot objection points to a significant epistemic risk inherent in the 
structure of IBE. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will be setting this problem aside. 
Accordingly, I shall assume that the set of available hypotheses from which one is choosing 
in IBE is ideal in the sense of including a correct explanation. 
Another structural problem – what Douven (forthcoming) refers to as the asymmetry 
problem – arises even in situations in which the true explanation has been considered. While 
the fact that a hypothesis H explains one’s evidence better than some other hypotheses might 
indicate that H is likelier to be true than those other hypotheses, this comparative claim is 
compatible with H being very improbable indeed.
4
 However, nearly all proponents of IBE 
are committed to IBE licensing an absolute judgment to the effect that H is least somewhat 
likely to be true.
5
 This problem is not solved by adding the caveat that the explanation 
provided by the inferred hypothesis H must also be ‘satisfactory’ (Musgrave 1988: 238-239) 
or ‘good enough’ (Lipton 2004: 63, 154), since that is meant to impose only a minimal 
constraint on the explanatory loveliness of H.
6
 My discussion below has implications for how 
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to address this problem in that I argue for an inferential pattern that significantly ameliorates 
the epistemic risks of IBE in this regard. However, my main focus will be on a somewhat 
more specific structural problem with IBE – one that has hitherto not been given due 
attention. 
 
2. The Problem of Multiple Plausible Rivals  
There are several live scientific hypotheses that purport to explain the origin of life on Earth, 
i.e. why living organisms arose from non-living matter on this planet a few billion years ago. 
Chief among these is a hypothesis known as RNA world, which roughly states that life began 
with the formation of RNA molecules that were capable of self-replication and which would 
later evolve into the DNA and protein molecules which are the building blocks of today’s 
living organisms. The explanation provided by the RNA world hypothesis is arguably quite 
lovely indeed, e.g. in that it posits no new kinds of entities beyond the already familiar RNA 
molecules and yet elegantly explains, if true, how genetic information would have been 
stored, replicated, and transmitted in the way required for living organisms to evolve. To be 
sure, biologists have also proposed several other explanations, the most plausible of which 
arguably involve positing some other self-replicating medium, e.g. various other nucleic acids 
such as PNA (peptide nucleic acid), TNA (threose nucleic acid), or GNA (glycol nucleic 
acid). Furthermore, some biologists also take seriously hypotheses according to which life 
began with the formation of metabolizing cells rather than any kind of genetic material. 
Interestingly, even the majority of biologists who consider the RNA world hypotheses 
to be by far the best explanation of the available evidence are quite hesitant to infer that it is 
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true (and that its alternatives are false).
7
 It is therefore doubtful that IBE is descriptively 
correct in this case. More importantly, biologists’ reluctance to infer the loveliest explanatory 
hypothesis seems, contrary to IBE, normatively appropriate. After all, the sheer multitude of 
available competing explanations – each one of which has a non-negligible likelihood of being 
correct – suggests that the truth is quite likely to lie with one of these many alternatives. To 
be sure, it may still be perfectly reasonable for biologists to use the RNA world hypothesis as 
a working hypothesis to guide further scientific inquiry, since one can do no better than to 
operate with the best theory available. However, the point remains that in this case the 
epistemic merits of inferring in accordance with IBE is undermined by the availability of 
multiple plausible competing explanatory hypotheses – a factor that IBE simply ignores. 
 In case proponents of IBE take issue with my description of this particular case, let 
us note that the problem here is perfectly general. Suppose {H1,…,Hn} is a set of available 
competing explanatory hypotheses (assumed to be ideal in order to set aside the bad lot 
problem). According to IBE, whether a hypothesis Hi in this set is inferable will depend 
exclusively on whether Hi is lovelier than other hypotheses in the set (and perhaps also on 
whether Hi is ‘sufficiently’ lovely). Intuitively, however, the extent to which it is reasonable to 
infer Hi also depends on whether there are many plausible alternatives to Hi that are lovely 
enough to be taken seriously as alternative explanations for E (even if they are not nearly as 
lovely as Hi itself). The general problem here for IBE is that it has no resources for taking 
into account the possibility that an inference to Hi may be undermined by the availability of 
multiple plausible rivals to the loveliest explanatory hypothesis. Of course, IBE could still be 
a good rule of thumb in many cases; nevertheless, the problem demonstrates that IBE 
ignores a factor that is relevant to how reasonable it is to infer the hypothesis that best explains 
the available evidence. 
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 This common attitude is summed up nicely in Bernhardt’s sympathetic discussion of the hypothesis, 
entitled ‘The RNA world hypothesis: the worst theory of the early evolution of life (except for all the 
others)’ (Bernhardt 2013: 1). 
 It is worth noting that those who favor other explanations, such as the PNA, TNA and GNA 
world hypotheses, are also hesitant to infer that these other theories are true. The point here is that 
biologists are generally hesitant to infer that the theories they think provides the best explanation of 
the evidence is in fact true, contrary to what IBE recommends. 
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One might think that this problem can be solved with minor modifications to IBE by 
either requiring that the inferred hypothesis H provide a far better explanation than 
competing available hypotheses, or by requiring that we set some fairly high absolute 
threshold for H’s explanatory loveliness.8 However, it is easy to see that no solution of this 
kind will get to the heart of the problem. Consider a variation of the previous case in which 
there are only two plausible competing explanations, e.g. a case in which all available 
explanations for the origin of life have been empirically ruled out except for the RNA world 
hypothesis and the corresponding PNA world hypothesis. In that case, it would surely be 
more reasonable to infer that the RNA hypothesis is true than it was in the original case.
9
 
And yet altering the case in this way keeps fixed both the absolute explanatory loveliness of 
the loveliest explanation and the relative explanatory loveliness of the loveliest and second-
loveliest explanation. Accordingly, the modified versions of IBE we are now considering 
wrongly predicts that this altered case is on a par with the original case with regard to whether 
it is reasonable to infer the RNA world hypothesis. It should be clear, then, that we need to 
look elsewhere for a solution to the problem. 
 
3. Abductively Robust Inference 
As a first step towards solving the problem, notice that when it comes to explaining the origin 
of life of Earth there is an important claim that holds true on a number of the most plausible 
available competing explanatory hypotheses, viz. that life on Earth began with the formation 
of a genetic replicator of some sort or other. To be sure, this claim is false according to the 
metabolism-first hypothesis mentioned above, but that hypothesis is arguably less plausible 
than each of the RNA, PNA, TNA, and GNA world hypotheses – all of which do entail that 
claim. Unsurprisingly, then, the hypothesis that life arose from a genetic replicator – a 
                                                 
8
 See the previous footnote for further problems with the second of these two suggestions. 
9
 This is evidenced by the fact that the process of incrementally confirming scientific theories often 
involves eliminating alternative explanations for a given phenomenon even when those alternative 
explanations are not considered to be the most plausible. A case in point is are numerous alternatives 
to Einstein’s general theory of relativity that were proposed and systematically refuted in latter half of 
the 20
th
 century – for discussion, see Earman 1993: 173-181. 
 
7 
hypothesis entailed by, but not equivalent to, the RNA world hypothesis – can be found in 
many biology textbooks and has even entered some influential biological definitions of ‘life’. 
 The key insight here is one that is familiar from a relatively underexplored inferential 
strategy discussed in a different context by Woodward (2006). Suppose we have some data 
D from which we hope to infer a conclusion S. Suppose also that D does not by itself imply 
S, so that some additional assumption(s) are required for S to be inferred from D. 
Furthermore, suppose that a number of competing possible assumptions A1,…,Am are 
available, each one with some plausibility. If D implies S given any one of these assumptions 
(or if the probability of S given D and each assumption exceeds some particular threshold),
10
 
then the inference from D to S is said to be inferentially robust with respect to A1,…,Am. Now, 
the idea behind what Woodward calls Inferential Robustness Analysis (IRA) is that if it is 
known that one of the competing assumptions A1,…,Am is true (though it isn’t known which 
one is true) then the fact that the inference from D to S is inferentially robust with regard to 
A1,…,Am provides a strong reason for us to infer S from D. 
Woodward rightly criticizes IRA on the grounds that the conditions that would need 
to be satisfied to infer via IRA are ‘very strong’, so that ‘its range of application looks rather 
limited’ (Woodward 2006: 222). 11  As Lloyd (2015: 58) observes, this is a huge 
understatement. After all, it is hard enough to imagine any interesting cases in which we know 
for certain that one (but not which one) of some competing assumptions A1,…,Am is true; it is 
even harder to think of cases in which each one of these assumptions (together with some 
data D) entails any remotely interesting conclusion S. So, while IRA would certainly provide 
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a very strong reason to infer claims that are robust in the above sense, we would hardly ever 
be in a position to identify inferentially robust claims.
12
 
However, I now want to suggest that the core insight of IRA – viz., that the robustness 
of an inference under a variety of competing assumptions is an indicator of truth – can still 
be put to good use within a broadly-speaking ‘explanationist’ framework in which available 
hypotheses are compared with respect to their explanatory loveliness. The basic idea is that 
a claim may be inferred if it is entailed by all of the available competing explanatory 
hypotheses that do best on whatever explanatory virtues are taken to constitute explanatory 
loveliness. To make this more precise, we define a family of notions of ‘abductive robustness’ 
as follows (where k is an arbitrary natural number): 
For a given set of available competing hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} that potentially explain 
some evidence E, a claim C is said to be abductively robustk iff C is entailed by all of 
the k loveliest such hypotheses in {H1,…,Hn}. 
We use this to construct a family of corresponding inference rules: 
Abductively Robust Inferencek (ARIk): If C is abductively robustk relative to an ideal 
set of available competing hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} that potentially explain E, then infer 
C from E. 
It would be easy to construct related, and perhaps more sophisticated, inferential patterns 
using the same basic idea. For example, one could define a gradable notion of explanatory 
robustness that varies with both the number of available explanatory hypotheses that entail 
C and the levels of explanatory loveliness exhibited by those hypotheses.
13
 It is also worth 
emphasizing that ARIk should, much like currently standard conceptions of IBE, be viewed 
as a heuristic inferential pattern appropriate for cognitively limited beings rather than as a 
prescription for ideal epistemic agents. 
                                                 
12
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 I refer to ARIk as an inferential pattern because we obtain distinct inference rules 
depending on what value we give to the variable k. In choosing a value for k, one is 
confronted with a familiar trade-off between minimizing epistemic risk and maximizing 
applicability. For example, a higher value for k decreases the epistemic risk of inferring in 
accordance with ARIk, but it also decreases the number of situations in which the rule would 
be applicable (since less is generally implied by every member of a set than by every member 
of its proper subsets). It would be unwise to try to fix once and for all a specific value for k 
since different specifications might be appropriate for different purposes. For example, if it 
is important that some conclusion C be inferred only if C is almost certainly true, then it 
makes sense to employ an instance of ARIk in which k is quite high; in other circumstances, 
k can be considerably lower. That said, the more interesting versions of ARIk will arguably 
assign fairly moderate values to k. To see this clearly, let us consider what inference rules are 
obtained in the two extreme cases in which k equals n and 1 respectively.  
 On the one hand, setting k = n gives us a very safe inference rule – ARIn – in which 
the entire epistemic risk consists in the possibility that all of the available hypotheses are false. 
It is worth noting that since ARIn requires the conclusion C to hold in all of the available 
competing hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} that potentially explain the evidence E, ARIn does not 
require its users to compare any of the hypotheses {H1,…,Hn} with regard to their explanatory 
loveliness. Put differently, evaluating the comparative loveliness of some group of hypotheses 
{H1,…,Hn} is irrelevant when the question is whether a conclusion C follows from E given 
each of the n hypotheses. In this respect ARIn, resembles IRA, which also does not require 
any estimation of comparative explanatory loveliness. Unfortunately, however, ARIn also 
inherits the aforementioned applicability problem for IRA, in that we are rarely if ever able 
to infer any substantial consequences from all available competing explanatory hypotheses. 
Thus, as with IRA, the range of applications of ARIn would be extremely limited. As soon as 
we have even a single hypothesis Hi in our set of available competing explanatory hypotheses 
{H1,…,Hn} such that E and Hi do not entail C, ARIn becomes inapplicable. 
On the other hand, by setting k = 1 we obtain an inference rule – ARI1 – according 
to which one may infer a claim C from E if C is entailed by the single loveliest of the available 
competing hypotheses that potentially explain E. Now, recall (from section 1) that IBE also 
licenses inferences to the deductive entailments of the loveliest available explanatory 
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hypothesis. Interestingly, then, we get the result that ARI1 is identical to IBE: Both license an 
inference from E to C just in case C is entailed by the loveliest of the available competing 
hypotheses that would, if true, explain E.
14
 In other words, IBE is a special limiting case of 
the more general inferential pattern ARIk – a case obtained when k is set to an extreme value 
in order to maximize applicability at the expense of epistemic caution. Given this, it should 
hardly have been surprising that IBE has the systematic epistemic defect discussed in section 
2. Indeed, note that IBE/ARI1 is the only instance of ARIk that licenses the dubious inference 
to the RNA world hypothesis since even just the two loveliest explanatory hypotheses in that 
case do not both entail that life began with the formation of RNA molecules. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have seen that a traditional conception of abductive reasoning in terms of Inference to 
the Best Explanation (IBE) faces a heretofore unrecognized problem in cases where there 
are multiple plausible potential explanations for the available evidence. Inspired by the 
scientific methodology of Inferential Robustness Analysis (IRA), we approached this 
problem by constructing a family of abductive inference rules, Abductively Robust Inferencek 
(ARIk), which require the desired conclusion to follow from the evidence given each of the k 
loveliest explanatory hypotheses available. Interestingly, IBE here emerges as a limiting case 
(k = 1) in which one completely sacrifices epistemic caution for the sake of maximizing 
applicability; similarly, a rule that resembles IRA emerges at the other end of the spectrum 
(k = n), i.e. when one completely sacrifices applicability in order to minimize epistemic risk. 
This suggests that it would often be wise to steer clear of these two extremes (1 < k < n) in 
order to strike an appropriate balance between epistemic caution and applicability.
15
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 Note that since every proposition entails itself, this also covers standard cases of IBE in which one 
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